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Rivalry in uncertain export markets: commitment versus flexibility
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DOI：10.1016/S0022-1996(03)00082-5.png)
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En 中文
This paper examines optimal trade policy in a two-period oligopoly model, with a home and a foreign firm choosing capital and output. Demand uncertainty, resolved in period two, gives rise to a trade-off between strategic commitment and flexibility in the firms' investment decisions. Finns' investment timing is endogenous and can be manipulated by the home government, which sets a subsidy before firms decide when to invest. We show that when the government wishes to manipulate investment timing, it will choose its policy to deter investment commitment by the home or the foreign firm. (C) 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Keyword:
demand uncertainty
strategic commitment
flexibility
trade policy
commitment deterrence
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THE SENSITIVITY OF STRATEGIC AND CORRECTIVE RESEARCH-AND-DEVELOPMENT POLICY IN OLIGOPOLISTIC INDUSTRIES寡头垄断行业中战略和纠正性研发政策的敏感性
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