返回
Robust Sensor Localization against Known Sensor Position Attacks
DOI:10.1109/TMC.2018.2883578.png)
摘要
En 中文
Many localization techniques for wireless sensor networks have been proposed to estimate sensor positions even when there is malicious location information which distorts the estimate. Some of those solutions efficiently estimate sensor positions using the Minimum Mean Square Estimation methods and the Degree-Of-Consistency (DOC). Although such solutions can filter out most of malicious information, if an attacker knows the position of the target sensor, the attacker can significantly alter its estimated position. In this paper, we introduce two attacks based on the knowledge of target sensor positions. The first attack, called Aligned-Beacon-Position (ABP) attack, exploits beacon nodes that are aligned in a line. The second attack, called inside-attack, disables the DOC filtering algorithm by placing malicious location references inside benign location references. To protect against those two known sensor position attacks, we introduce two defense schemes. First, we propose a novel beacon placement strategy to protect against ABP attacks. Second, we present a filtering technique that can filter out malicious location references introduced by inside-attacks. Finally, we propose a localization algorithm which has enhanced accuracy and efficiency compared with previous algorithms. We assess the impact of those attacks and the performance of our defense schemes by simulation and test-bed experiments.
Keyword:
Robot sensing systems
Global Positioning System
Mobile computing
Wireless sensor networks
Estimation
Receivers
Security
Secure localization
sensor localization
MMSE
known sensor position attacks
beacon deployment
AI总结
对已上传原文的论文进行重点信息的提取,主要内容包括:简要概述、研究摘要、背景介绍、关键亮点、图文解析、展望与总结。
期刊
IF:
9.2
论文数:
5.9K
被引数:
1.8W
机构
引用论文
AB initio study of the structures and vibrational frequencies of CH3SiF3, [CH3SiF4]− and [CH3SiF5]2−

