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Secure Machine Learning Hardware: Challenges and Progress

delete2025-01-01
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PRE
AI
K
Kyungmi Lee *
M
Maitreyi Ashok
S
Saurav Maji
R
Rashmi Agrawal
A
Ajay Joshi
M
Mengjia Yan
J
Joel Emer
A
Anantha P. Chandrakasan
DOI:10.1109/MCAS.2024.3509376delete
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摘要

摘要

En 中文
With the rising adoption of deep neural networks (DNNs) for commercial and high-stakes applications that process sensitive user data and make critical decisions, security concerns are paramount. An adversary can undermine the confidentiality of user input or a DNN model, mislead a DNN to make wrong predictions, or even render a machine learning application unavailable to valid requests. While security vulnerabilities that enable such exploits can exist across multiple levels of the technology stack that supports machine learning applications, the hardware-level vulnerabilities can be particularly problematic. In this article, we provide a comprehensive review of the hardware-level vulnerabilities affecting domain-specific DNN inference accelerators and recent progress in secure hardware design to address these. As domain-specific DNN accelerators have a number of differences compared to general-purpose processors and cryptographic accelerators where the hardware-level vulnerabilities have been thoroughly investigated, there are unique challenges and opportunities for secure machine learning hardware. We first categorize the hardware-level vulnerabilities into three scenarios based on an adversary's capability: 1) an adversary can only attack the off-chip components, such as the off-chip DRAM and the data bus; 2) an adversary can directly attack the on-chip structures in a DNN accelerator; and 3) an adversary can insert hardware trojans during the manufacturing and design process. For each category, we survey recent studies on attacks that pose practical security challenges to DNN accelerators. Then, we present recent advances in the defense solutions for DNN accelerators, addressing those security challenges with circuit-, architecture-, and algorithm-level techniques.
Keyword:
Surveys
Program processors
Reviews
Random access memory
Artificial neural networks
Machine learning
Predictive models
System-on-chip
Security
Trojan horses
Domain specific languages
Hardware security
DNN accelerators
sidechannel attacks
fault injection attacks
memory security
hardware trojan

期刊

IEEE Circuits and Systems Magazine 封面图
IEEE Circuits and Systems Magazine
IF:
3.5
论文数:
530
被引数:
1.3K

机构

I
intel usa
学者数:
736
论文数: 548
被引数: 1
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