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Securing Property Rights

delete2021-04-01
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OA
AI
A
A. Patrick Behrer *
E
Edward L. Glaeser
G
Giacomo A. M. Ponzetto
A
Andrei Shleifer
DOI:10.1086/712733delete
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摘要

摘要

En 中文
A central challenge in securing property rights is the subversion of justice. We present a model of a polluter whose discharges harm multiple owners, and we compare property rules, liability rules, and regulation on efficiency grounds. We provide conditions under which property rules are preferred to liability rules, thus verifying the Calabresi-Melamed conjecture. Regulation that enforces partial abatement may be preferred to either of the extreme rules. An empirical analysis of water quality in the United States before and after the Clean Water Act shows that the effects of regulation are consistent with several predictions of the model.
Keyword:
LIABILITY RULES
CONTRACTS
ENFORCEMENT
INVESTMENT
CITY
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期刊

Journal of Political Economy 封面图
Journal of Political Economy
IF:
6.3
论文数:
2.6K
被引数:
3.2W

机构

H
Harvard University
学者数:
26.5W
论文数: 22.0W
被引数: 28.7W
C
centre de recerca en economia internacional (crei)
学者数:
65
论文数: 72
被引数: 1
S
Stanford University
学者数:
9.6W
论文数: 8.2W
被引数: 17.0W
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