.png){kind=icon}
返回
Selecting cheap-talk equilibria
.png){kind=icon}
OA
AI
DOI：10.1111/j.0012-9682.2008.00819.x.png)
.png){kind=icon}
.png){kind=icon}
分享.png){kind=icon}
收藏
摘要
En 中文
There are typically multiple equilibrium outcomes in the Crawford-Sobel (CS) model of strategic information transmission. This paper identifies a simple condition on equilibrium payoffs, called NITS (no incentive to separate), that selects among CS equilibria. Under a commonly used regularity condition, only the equilibrium with the maximal number of induced actions satisfies NITS. We discuss various justifications for NITS, including perturbed cheap-talk games with nonstrategic players or costly lying. We also apply NITS to other models of cheap talk, illustrating its potential beyond the CS framework.
Keyword:
cheap talk
babbling
equilibrium selection
almost-cheap talk
AI总结
对已上传原文的论文进行重点信息的提取，主要内容包括：简要概述、研究摘要、背景介绍、关键亮点、图文解析、展望与总结。
期刊
IF:
7.1
论文数:
3.0K
被引数:
4.3W
机构
引用论文
分享收藏分享收藏分享收藏An Experimental Study of the Heat Storage and the Discharge Performance and an Economic Performance Analysis of a Flat Plate Phase Change Material (PCM) Storage Tank.png)
Energies
OAAI
EnergiesIF0
OAAI分享收藏分享收藏
查看更多内容