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Selective-Memory Equilibrium

delete2024-12-01
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PRE
AI
D
Drew Fudenberg *
G
Giacomo Lanzani
P
Philipp Strack
DOI:10.1086/731412delete
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摘要

摘要

En 中文
We study agents who are more likely to remember some experiences than others but update beliefs as if the experiences they remember are the only ones that occurred. To understand the long-run effects of selective memory, we propose selective-memory equilibrium. We show that if the agent's behavior converges, their limit strategy is a selective-memory equilibrium, and we provide a sufficient condition for behavior to converge. We use this equilibrium concept to explore the consequences of several well-documented biases. We also show that there is a close connection between selective-memory equilibria and the outcomes of misspecified learning.
Keyword:
DECISION-MAKING
MODEL
JUDGMENT
CONFIDENCE
GAMBLERS
MOOD
RISK

期刊

Journal of Political Economy 封面图
Journal of Political Economy
IF:
6.3
论文数:
2.6K
被引数:
3.2W

机构

H
Harvard University
学者数:
26.5W
论文数: 22.0W
被引数: 28.7W
Y
Yale University
学者数:
6.5W
论文数: 6.0W
被引数: 10.0W
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