Sensor deception attacks against security in supervisory control systems

Jingshi Yao

doi:10.1016/j.automatica.2023.111330

2024-01-01

Jingshi Yao

Shaoyuan Li

Xiang Yin *

DOI：10.1016/j.automatica.2023.111330

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摘要

En 中文

This paper investigates the problem of synthesizing sensor deception attacks against security in the context of supervisory control of discrete -event systems (DES). We consider a DES plant controlled by a supervisor, whose security requirement is to maintain the initial -secret of the system undetected, i.e., it does not want to reveal the fact that it was initiated from a secret state. On the other hand, there exists an active attacker that can tamper with the observations received by the supervisor by, e.g., hacking into the communication channel between the sensors and the supervisor. The objective of the attacker is to deceive the supervisor such that the initial -secret is revealed due to incorrect control actions. We investigate the problem from the attacker's point of view and focus on synthesizing attack strategies that threaten the security of the system. We consider two levels of success of the attacker: one requires that the attacker can detect the initial -secret of the system almost surely and the other only requires that the attacker has the possibility to detect the initial -secret of the system. For both cases, we present algorithms for synthesizing successful attack strategies. Our approach is based on the All Attack Structure (AAS) which records state estimates for both the supervisor and the attacker. Structural properties of the security requirements are also leveraged to reduce the synthesis complexity. A running academic example is provided to illustrate the proposed synthesis procedures. (c) 2023 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keyword:

Discrete -event systems

Sensor attacks

Information -flow security

Opacity