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摘要
En 中文
We investigate whether corporate insiders attempt to circumvent insider trading restrictions by using their private information to facilitate trading in economically linked firms, a phenomenon we call shadow trading.'' Using measures of informed trading to proxy for shadow trading, we find increased levels of informed trading among business partners and competitors before a firm releases private information. To rule out alternative explanations, we examine two shocks to insiders' incentives to engage in shadow trading: high-profile regulatory enforcement against conventional insider trading, and staggered changes to their outside employment opportunities. Finally, we document attenuated levels of informed trading among business partners and competitors when firms prohibit shadow trading. Overall, we provide evidence that shadow trading is an undocumented and widespread mechanism that insiders use to avoid regulatory scrutiny.
Keyword:
business partners
insider trading
private information
information transfers
spillover
SEC
期刊
IF:
4.4
论文数:
2.4K
被引数:
2.5W
机构
引用论文
Should Investors Follow the Prophets or the Bears? Evidence on the Use of Public Information by Analysts and Short Sellers
ACCOUNTING REVIEW
IF4.4
Individual Investor Trading and Return Patterns around Earnings Announcements
JOURNAL OF FINANCE
IF9.5

