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Shareholders' Say on Pay: Does It Create Value?

delete2010-12-23
delete215
PRE
AI
J
Jie Cai *
R
Ralph A. Walkling
DOI：10.1017/S0022109010000803delete
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摘要

摘要

En 中文
Congress and activists recently proposed giving shareholders a say (vote) on executive pay. We find that when the House passed the Say-on-Pay Bill, the market reaction was significantly positive for firms with high abnormal chief executive officer (CEO) compensation, with low pay-for-performance sensitivity, and responsive to shareholder pressure. However, activist-sponsored say-on-pay proposals target large firms, not those with excessive CEO pay, poor governance, or poor performance. The market reacts negatively to labor-sponsored proposal, announcements and positively when these proposals are defeated. Our findings suggest that say-on-pay creates value for companies with inefficient compensation but can destroy value for others.
Keyword:
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT
INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITY SET
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES
CEO COMPENSATION
STOCK
DISCLOSURE
PROPOSALS
IMPACT
ASSOCIATION
AI总结

AI总结

对已上传原文的论文进行重点信息的提取，主要内容包括：简要概述、研究摘要、背景介绍、关键亮点、图文解析、展望与总结。

期刊

Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 封面图
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
IF:
2.8
论文数:
2.3K
被引数:
1.0W

机构

D
Drexel University
学者数:
1.3W
论文数: 1.1W
被引数: 2.2W
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