.png){kind=icon}
返回
Shiftable externalities: A market solution
.png){kind=icon}
PRE
AI
DOI：10.1023/A:1014544516120.png)
.png){kind=icon}
.png){kind=icon}
分享.png){kind=icon}
收藏
摘要
En 中文
In this paper we propose a regulatory scheme for what has become known as 'shiftable' externalities ('Not In My Backyard' type garbage location problems where the externality is characterized by the absence of jointness in supply). The scheme facilitates the establishment of a market for the externality, and it is feasible for a wider class of regulation problems and more information efficient than the other regulatory schemes that have been proposed for this type of externality. Finally, we show that it is possible to decentralize the participation decision so as to take account of verification costs.
Keyword:
incentive mechanisms
shiftable externalities
AI总结
对已上传原文的论文进行重点信息的提取，主要内容包括：简要概述、研究摘要、背景介绍、关键亮点、图文解析、展望与总结。
