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Single-Trace Attacks on Message Encoding in Lattice-Based KEMs
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DOI：10.1109/ACCESS.2020.3029521.png)
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摘要
En 中文
In this article, we propose single-trace side-channel attacks against lattice-based key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs) that are the third-round candidates of the national institute of standards and technology (NIST) standardization project. Specifically, we analyze the message encoding operation in the encapsulation phase of lattice-based KEMs to obtain an ephemeral session key. We conclude that a singletrace leakage implies a whole key recovery: the experimental results realized on a ChipWhisperer UFO STM32F3 target board achieve a success rate of 100% for CRYSTALS-KYBER and SABER regardless of an optimization level and those greater than 79% for FrodoKEM. We further demonstrate that the proposed attack methodologies are not restricted to the above algorithms but are widely applicable to other NIST post-quantum cryptography (PQC) candidates, including NTRU Prime and NTRU.
Keyword:
Key encapsulation mechanism
lattice-based cryptography
message encoding
side-channel attack
single-trace attack
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期刊
IF:
3.6
论文数:
9.8W
被引数:
29.4W
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