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Skill Versus Voice in Local Development
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DOI：10.1162/rest_a_01082.png)
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Where the state is weak, traditional authorities control the local provision of public goods. These leaders come from an older, less educated generation and often rule in an authoritarian and exclusionary fashion. This means the skills of community members may not be leveraged in policymaking. We experimentally evaluate two solutions to this problem in Sierra Leone: one encourages delegation to higher-skill individuals, and a second fosters broader inclusion in decision making. In a real-world infrastructure grants competition, a public nudge to delegate led to better outcomes than the default of chiefly control, whereas attempts to boost participation were largely ineffective.
Keyword:
FINANCIAL INCENTIVES
FIELD EXPERIMENT
POLITICIANS
BUREAUCRATS
CONFLICT
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6.8
论文数:
3.6K
被引数:
2.1W
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