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Structuring international cooperative ventures

delete2002-07-01
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PRE
AI
T
Thomas H. Noe
M
Michael J. Rebello
S
Shrikhande, MM *
DOI:10.1093/rfs/15.4.1251delete
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摘要

摘要

En 中文
We examine the effect of bargaining power and informational asymmetry on the design of international cooperative ventures in the presence of restrictions on equity participation and investment. When the bargaining advantage rests with the multinational, equity participation restrictions can increase the profits to domestic firms and encourage suboptimal investment policies. Overinvestment occurs when the multinational's bargaining advantage is reinforced by an informational advantage, while underinvestment occurs when the domestic firm possesses the informational advantage. In contrast, when the bargaining advantage rests with the domestic firm, equity participation restrictions do not affect investment levels.
Keyword:
RESEARCH JOINT VENTURES
ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
EXCHANGE
ACQUISITIONS
INVESTMENT
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期刊

Review of Financial Studies 封面图
Review of Financial Studies
IF:
5.4
论文数:
2.8K
被引数:
3.0W

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