.png){kind=icon}
返回
Teams, repeated tasks, and implicit incentives
.png){kind=icon}
PRE
AI
DOI：10.1016/S0165-4101(96)00446-6.png)
.png){kind=icon}
原文求助.png){kind=icon}
分享.png){kind=icon}
收藏
摘要
En 中文
In a team setting, wherein only group performance is tracked, we show that muted incentive contracts may be sufficient to motivate team members. By having the team repeat a task, explicit (contractual) incentives can be substituted by implicit incentives team members provide to each other. We also study an example in which, despite uncorrelated individual performance measures being available, it is optimal to condition each manager's pay on both managers' performance. This can be viewed as creating a group performance measure. Using a group performance measure provides each manager with incentives to monitor and a means of punishing other managers.
Keyword:
implicit incentives
mutual monitoring
teams
期刊
IF:
6.8
论文数:
1.5K
被引数:
1.7W
机构
暂无机构信息
引用论文
.png){kind=icon}
分享收藏
查看更多内容