.png){kind=icon}
返回
.png){kind=icon}
.png){kind=icon}
.png){kind=icon}
.png){kind=icon}
.png){kind=icon}
摘要
En 中文
State repression is a common tool used by autocrats, and to understand how the implementation of repression unfolds, I develop a theory with two key features. First, uncertainty resulting from political instability creates an important agency problem between a leader and members of the repressive apparatus. As a consequence of this agency problem, leaders must compensate the repressive apparatus for conducting repression, thus affecting leaders' net benefit of retaining power. Second, political instability and the use of repression comprise an endogenous process that depends on a coordination dynamic between civilians. I show that the agency relationship I highlight implies that political institutions designed to alleviate problems associated with political instability can actually lead to higher levels of repression. Finally, I establish that leaders wanting to implement repression prefer to target civilians who are concentrated (geographically, economically, or socially) and that the relationship with the capacity to resist is more nuanced due to novel selection effects.
Keyword:
repression
agency problem
coordination
political instability
AI总结
对已上传原文的论文进行重点信息的提取，主要内容包括：简要概述、研究摘要、背景介绍、关键亮点、图文解析、展望与总结。
期刊
IF:
3.8
论文数:
5.8K
被引数:
1.3W
机构
引用论文
.png){kind=icon}
查看更多内容