.png){kind=icon}
返回
The Biodiversity Bargaining Problem
.png){kind=icon}
PRE
AI
DOI：10.1007/s10640-010-9416-z.png)
.png){kind=icon}
原文求助.png){kind=icon}
分享.png){kind=icon}
收藏
摘要
En 中文
We employ cooperative bargaining theory and Nash's 'rational threats' idea to cast light on the biodiversity bargaining problem. The problem of global environmental negotiations is argued to be of the nature of a bargaining problem, in which bargainers must agree on the distribution of cooperative surplus in order to move to the bargaining frontier. We discuss the importance of both efficiency (bargaining frontier) and fairness (recognition of characteristics of bargainers) in the choice of the appropriate contract. We show that the incremental cost contract, used to resolve the biodiversity bargaining problem, is of the form of an extreme point contract that fails to recognise the contributions of the South to the production of cooperative surplus. A rational response to such a contract is the use of threats of biodiversity destruction. Contracts must evince both efficiency and fairness in order to represent lasting solutions.
Keyword:
Biodiversity
Incremental costs
International environmental agreements
Nash cooperative bargaining
North-south bargaining
Rational threats
AI总结
对已上传原文的论文进行重点信息的提取，主要内容包括：简要概述、研究摘要、背景介绍、关键亮点、图文解析、展望与总结。
期刊
IF:
3.4
论文数:
2.7K
被引数:
6.5K
机构
引用论文
The reliance of northern economies on southern biodiversity: Biodiversity as information.png)
ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS
ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICSIF6.3
PREAI
分享收藏
查看更多内容