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The Combinatorial Assignment Problem: Approximate Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes
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DOI：10.1086/664613.png)
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摘要
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This paper proposes a new mechanism for combinatorial assignment-for example, assigning schedules of courses to students-based on an approximation to competitive equilibrium from equal incomes (CEEI) in which incomes are unequal but arbitrarily close together. The main technical result is an existence theorem for approximate CEEI. The mechanism is approximately efficient, satisfies two new criteria of outcome fairness, and is strategyproof in large markets. Its performance is explored on real data, and it is compared to alternatives from theory and practice: all other known mechanisms are either unfair ex post or manipulable even in large markets, and most are both manipulable and unfair.
Keyword:
INDIVISIBLE GOODS
FAIR DIVISION
HOUSE ALLOCATION
BUSINESS SCHOOLS
STRATEGY-PROOF
GAME-THEORY
STABILITY
MARKETS
DESIGN
EFFICIENCY
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6.3
论文数:
2.6K
被引数:
3.2W
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