arrow
返回

The editor-manuscript game

delete2021-03-06
delete4
PRE
AI
J
J. A. García *
R
Rosa Rodríguez‐Sánchez
J
J. Fdez‐Valdivia
DOI:10.1007/s11192-021-03918-xdelete
delete原文链接
delete原文求助
delete分享
delete收藏
摘要

摘要

En 中文
Scientific journals receive an increasing number of submissions and many of them will be desk rejected without receiving detailed feedback from reviewers. In fact, the number of desk rejections has risen dramatically in the last decade. In this paper, we contribute to the literature by examining an editor's incentives either to issue a desk decision that is based solely on their imperfect private information about the manuscript's quality or to send the paper to external peer reviewers that better reveal its quality. In our model, without external review, the journal editor receives an informative but imperfect signal of the manuscript's quality. We focus on the case in which editors may differ in their decision accuracy, and highlight the consideration that even an editor with the best expertise and the best intentions may be unable to reach a perfect assessment of the manuscript's quality. In our baseline model, the journal editor is not driven by financial interests but is nevertheless impurely altruistic in that the editor has a reputation consideration that may be tied to authors' observational learning of the editor's decision pathway (i.e., the process to reach the eventual editorial decision, which may or may not involve external peer review). Also, the editor in our setting is imperfectly informed about the manuscript's quality unless they send the manuscript out to review. Our paper shows that high-ability editors tend to send fewer papers to external review than they should as a way to signal their ability. This is so because external peer review and editor's decision expertise may substitute for each other.
Keyword:
Peer review
Editors
Manuscripts
Desk decisions
External review
Manuscript quality
Decision pathway
AI总结

AI总结

对已上传原文的论文进行重点信息的提取,主要内容包括:简要概述、研究摘要、背景介绍、关键亮点、图文解析、展望与总结。

期刊

Scientometrics 封面图
Scientometrics
IF:
3.5
论文数:
8.1K
被引数:
2.2W

机构

U
University of Granada
学者数:
2.3W
论文数: 1.9W
被引数: 24
引用论文

引用论文

Identifying predatory or pseudo-journals
err2017-06-15
err77
errOAAI
errLaine, Christine; Winker, Margaret A.
err分享
err收藏
Firm action needed on predatory journals
err2015-01-16
err140
PREAI
errClark, Jocalyn; Smith, Richard
err分享
err收藏
The author-editor game
err2015-03-26
err25
PREAI
errGarcia, J. A.; Rodriguez-Sanchez, Rosa; Fdez-Valdivia, J.
err分享
err收藏
Confirmatory bias in peer review
err2020-01-25
err18
PREAI
errGarcia, J. A.; Rodriguez-Sanchez, Rosa; Fdez-Valdivia, J.
err分享
err收藏
err分享
err收藏
Modelling the impact of effective private provider engagement on tuberculosis control in urban India
err2019-03-07
err15
errOAAI
errArinaminpathy, Nimalan; Deo, Sarang; Singh, Simrita; Khaparde, Sunil; Rao, Raghuram; Vadera, Bhavin; Kulshrestha, Niraj; Gupta, Devesh; Rade, Kiran; Nair, Sreenivas Achuthan; Dewan, Puneet
err分享
err收藏
Predatory journals and their effects on scientific research community
err2017-06-15
err16
errOAAI
errHabibzadeh, Farrokh; Simundic, Ana-Maria
err分享
err收藏
The author-reviewer game作者-评论者游戏
err2020-06-17
err12
PREAI
errGarcia, J. A.; Rodriguez-Sanchez, Rosa; Fdez-Valdivia, J.
err分享
err收藏
学者 查看更多内容