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The is-ought fallacy fallacy
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DOI：10.1017/S0140525X11000665.png)
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Mere facts about how the world is cannot determine how we ought to think or behave. Elqayam & Evans (E&E) argue that this is-ought fallacy undercuts the use of rational analysis in explaining how people reason, by ourselves and with others. But this presumed application of the is-ought fallacy is itself fallacious. Rational analysis seeks to explain how people do reason, for example in laboratory experiments, not how they ought to reason. Thus, no ought is derived from an is; and rational analysis is unchallenged by E&E's arguments.
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13.7
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1.6W
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