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摘要
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In this paper we define a Solution for multichoice games which is a generalization of the Owen coalition value (Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems: Essays in Honor of Oskar Morgenstern, Springer, New York, pp. 76-88, 1977) for transferable utility cooperative games and the Egalitarian solution (Peters and Zanks, Ann. Oper. Res. 137, 399-409, 2005) for multichoice games. We also prove that this solution can be seen as a generalization of the configuration value and the dual configuration value (Albizuri et al., Games Econ. Behav. 57, 1-17, 2006) for transferable utility cooperative games.
Keyword:
Shapley value
Multichoice games
Coalition structure
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IF:
4.5
论文数:
8.0K
被引数:
2.1W
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