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The Technical Default Spread

delete2024-09-09
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PRE
AI
E
Emilio Bisetti
李
李凯 (Kai Li) *
J
Jun Yu
DOI:10.1093/rfs/hhae042delete
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摘要

摘要

En 中文
We study the quantitative impact of lender control rights on corporate investment, asset prices, and the aggregate economy. We build a general equilibrium model in which the breaching of a loan covenant (technical default) entails a switch in investment control rights from borrowers to lenders. Lenders optimally choose low-risk projects, thus mitigating borrowers' risk-taking incentives and lowering the cost of equity. This mechanism generates strong macroeconomic effects and mitigates the financial accelerator. Consistent with our model, proximity to technical default in the data is associated with 4.12% lower returns and lower exposure to systematic risk.
Keyword:
E2
E3
G12

期刊

Review of Financial Studies 封面图
Review of Financial Studies
IF:
5.4
论文数:
2.8K
被引数:
3.3W

机构

P
Peking University
学者数:
7.0K
论文数: 2.1K
被引数: 7
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