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Traceability and Mass Policy Feedback Effects
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DOI：10.1017/S0003055424000704.png)
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Theory suggests that policy benefits delivered directly by government are most likely to affect the voting behavior of beneficiaries. Nearly every empirical study, however, analyzes a policy or program that meets this criterion. To address this limitation, I compare the electoral impacts of two New Deal-era employment programs-the Works Progress Administration (WPA) and the Public Works Administration (PWA)-which differed primarily in their traceability to government. Though both programs provided employment, the WPA directly hired and paid employees. In contrast, the PWA subsidized private sector employment. Across two datasets, I find that the WPA increased support for the enacting Democratic Party. As expected, however, the PWA had no discernible causal effect on voting patterns. These results offer the strongest evidence to date that whether policy beneficiaries can easily see government as responsible for their benefits shapes the development of mass policy feedback effects.
Keyword:
POLITICS
DEPRESSION
PROGRAM
ECONOMY
WELFARE
REFORM
VOTERS
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