Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games

doi:10.3982/ECTA12182

Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games

2015-01-01

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DOI：10.3982/ECTA12182

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This paper characterizes an equilibrium payoff subset for dynamic Bayesian games as discounting vanishes. Monitoring is imperfect, transitions may depend on actions, types may be correlated, and values may be interdependent. The focus is on equilibria in which players report truthfully. The characterization generalizes that for repeated games, reducing the analysis to static Bayesian games with transfers. With independent private values, the restriction to truthful equilibria is without loss, except for the punishment level: if players withhold their information during punishment-like phases, a folk theorem obtains.

Keyword:

Bayesian games

repeated games

folk theorem

Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games

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