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Underestimating Honesty in Distributive Negotiations: Misjudging Counterparts’ Motivations

delete2026-07-29
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PRE
AI
S
Shira Garber
S
Simone Moran
B
Boaz Keysar
Y
Yoella Bereby‐Meyer
DOI:10.1177/01461672261468054delete
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Abstract

Abstract

En 中文
<jats:p>Negotiators often face two dilemmas: whether to be honest and whether to believe their counterpart is honest. We propose a discrepancy in how negotiators approach these dilemmas, leading to an expected versus actual honesty gap. When deciding whether to be honest, negotiators are influenced not only by self-interest but also by moral identity concerns, which promote honesty. However, when deciding whether counterparts are honest, negotiators assume they are primarily motivated by self-interest and thus overestimate their dishonesty. Five studies examining online secondhand market negotiations found buyers often underestimated sellers’ honesty, and this was accounted for by their misperceptions of sellers’ motivations. While sellers tended to be honest because of moral identity concerns, buyers expected them to be driven primarily by self-interest. The actual-expected honesty gap was particularly prevalent when sellers’ moral identity concerns were situationally activated, and altering buyers’ perceptions of sellers’ motivations reduced the gap. Findings further suggest potential targeted interventions to foster trust.</jats:p>

Journal

Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin cover
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin
IF:
2.9
Papers:
5.0K
Citations:
2.0W

Organization

B
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
Scholars:
1.5K
Papers: 674
Citations: 1.6W
U
university of chicago
Scholars:
4.4W
Papers: 3.7W
Citations: 80
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