arrow
返回

Using Models to Persuade

delete2021-01-01
delete29
PRE
AI
S
Schwartzstein, Joshua *
S
Sunderam, Adi
DOI:10.1257/aer20191074delete
delete原文链接
delete原文求助
delete分享
delete收藏
摘要

摘要

En 中文
We present a framework where model persuaders inf hence receivers' beliefs by proposing models that organize past data to make predictions. Receivers are assumed to find models more compelling when they better explain the data, fixing receivers' prior beliefs. Model persuaders face a trade-gTh better-fitting models induce less movement in receivers' beliefs. Consequently, a receiver exposed to the true model can be most misled by persuasion when that model fits poorly, competition between persuaders tends to neutralize the data by pushing toward better-fitting models, and a persuader facing multiple receivers is more effective when he can send tailored, private messages.
Keyword:
TECHNICAL ANALYSIS
MEDIA BIAS
INFORMATION
COMPETITION
PARADIGM
BENEFITS
ADVISERS
MARKET
TESTS
NEWS

期刊

American Economic Review 封面图
American Economic Review
IF:
11.6
论文数:
5.0K
被引数:
7.5W

机构

H
Harvard University
学者数:
26.5W
论文数: 22.0W
被引数: 28.7W
引用论文

引用论文

暂无论文信息