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Value creation in shareholder activism
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DOI：10.1016/j.jfineco.2021.09.007.png)
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摘要
En 中文
We measure value creation by activist investors via structural estimation of a model of the choice between passive investment and activism. Our estimates imply that average returns following activist intent announcements consist of 74.8% expected value creation, or treatment, 13.4% stock picking, and 11.8% sample selection effects. Higher treatment values predict improvements in firm performance and lower proxy contest probabilities, whereas abnormal announcements returns do not, suggesting that our estimate identifies more effective activism campaigns. The evidence demonstrates the importance of using the joint distribution of investment strategies and announcement returns to recover the expected returns and costs of activism. (C) 2021 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
Keyword:
Shareholder activism
Value creation
Passive investors
Stock picking
Structural estimation
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被引数:
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Entrepreneurial Shareholder Activism: Hedge Funds and Other Private Investors.png)
JOURNAL OF FINANCEOAAI
JOURNAL OF FINANCEIF9.5
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