arrow
Return

Variations on distributed belief

delete2025-11-01
delete0
delete
OA
AI
J
John Lindqvist *
F
Fernando R. Velázquez–Quesada
T
Thomas Ågotnes
DOI:10.1007/s10849-025-09446-8delete
deleteOriginal
deleteShare
deleteSave
View PDF
Abstract

Abstract

En 中文
Motivated by the search for forms of distributed belief that do not collapse in the face of conflicting information, this paper introduces the notions of cautious and bold distributed belief. Both notions rely on maximally consistent subgroups of agents, with cautious quantifying universally and bold quantifying existentially. As a result, while the cautious distributed belief of a group is inconsistent only when all group members are individually inconsistent, the bold distributed belief of a group is never inconsistent. The paper discusses these two notions, presenting their respective modalities and semantic interpretations, discussing some of their basic properties, studying whether they preserve doxastic properties from the members of the group, and comparing them not only with standard distributed belief but also with one another, both at the level of modalities and at the level of language expressivity.
Keywords:
Epistemic logic
Distributed belief
Cautious distributed belief
Bold distributed belief
Expressivity
Bisimilarity
AI Summary

AI Summary

Key information extracted from the uploaded paper, including a brief overview, abstract, background, key highlights, visual analysis, and future outlook.

Journal

J
Journal of Logic Language and Information
IF:
0.6
Papers:
29
Citations:
0

Organization

U
university of bergen
Scholars:
2.0W
Papers: 1.7W
Citations: 19