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WASP: Stack protection for WebAssembly
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DOI：10.1016/j.sysarc.2025.103666.png)
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摘要
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WebAssembly is a binary executable format designed as a compilation target enabling high-level language code to be run natively in web browsers, JavaScript runtimes, and standalone interpreters. Previous work has highlighted WebAssembly's vulnerability to traditional memory exploits, such as stack smashing (stackbased buffer overflows), when compiled from memory-unsafe languages. Such vulnerabilities are used as a component in impactful end-to-end exploits, hence the design and implementation in WebAssembly of mitigations against memory exploits, such as stack canaries, is needed. We present WASP, an implementation of stack-based buffer overflow protection using stack canaries within Emscripten, the leading C and C++ to WebAssembly compiler. Further, we provide an extension to the standard stack smashing protection design, offering extra security against canary leak attacks by randomizing the canary on a per-function call basis. We verify WASP's effectiveness against proof-of-concept exploits. Evaluation results show that the overheads brought by WASP on execution time, executable binary size, and compilation workflow are negligible to low in all platforms considered: the Chromium web browser, the Node.js JavaScript runtime, as well as the standalone WebAssembly runtimes Wasmer and WAVM.
Keyword:
WebAssembly
Stack protector
Memory safety
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