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According to the orthodox treatment of risk preferences in decision theory, they are to be explained in terms of the agents desires about concrete outcomes. The orthodoxy has been criticized both for conflating two types of attitudes and for committing agents to attitudes that do not seem rationally required. To avoid these problems, it has been suggested that an agents attitudes to risk should be captured by a risk function that is independent of her utility and probability functions. The main problem with that approach is that it suggests that attitudes to risk are wholly distinct from peoples (non-instrumental) desires. To overcome this problem, we develop a framework where an agents utility function is defined over chance propositions (that is, propositions describing objective probability distributions) as well as ordinary (non-chance) ones, and argue that one should explain different risk attitudes in terms of different forms of the utility function over such propositions. 1Introduction 2Risk Attitudes in the von NeumannMorgenstern Framework 2.1Conceptual challenges 2.2Empirical challenges 3Risk-Weighted Expected Utility Theory 3.1Risk-weighted expected utility versus expected utility 3.2Problems with risk-weighted expected utility theory 4Risk Attitudes in the Jeffrey Framework 4.1Linearity, chance neutrality, and risk aversion 4.2Distinguishing risk attitudes 4.3Ambiguity and the four-fold patter 5Conclusion.
Keyword:
DECISION
UTILITY
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4.7
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2.2K
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