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When Does Communication Improve Coordination?

delete2010-09-01
delete77
PRE
AI
T
Tore Ellingsen *
R
Robert Östling
DOI:10.1257/aer.100.4.1695delete
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摘要

摘要

En 中文
We study costless pre-play communication of intentions among inexperienced players. Using the level-k model of strategic thinking to describe players' beliefs, we fully characterize the effects of preplay communication in symmetric 2 x 2 games. One-way communication weakly increases coordination on Nash equilibrium outcomes, although average payoffs sometimes decrease. Two-way communication further improves payoffs in some games but is detrimental in others. Moving beyond the class of symmetric 2 x 2 games, we find that communication facilitates coordination in common interest games with positive spillovers and strategic complementarities, but there are also games in which any type of communication hampers coordination. (JEL C72, D83)
Keyword:
PRE-PLAY COMMUNICATION
CHEAP-TALK
STRATEGIC THINKING
GUESSING GAMES
INFORMATION
MODEL
EQUILIBRIUM
COOPERATION
EFFICIENCY
COGNITION

期刊

American Economic Review 封面图
American Economic Review
IF:
11.6
论文数:
5.0K
被引数:
7.5W

机构

S
Stockholm University
学者数:
1.8W
论文数: 1.7W
被引数: 32
S
Stockholm School of Economics
学者数:
651
论文数: 996
被引数: 2.7K
引用论文

引用论文

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