.png){kind=icon}
返回
Why do banks target ROE?
.png){kind=icon}
PRE
AI
DOI：10.1016/j.jfs.2021.100856.png)
.png){kind=icon}
原文求助.png){kind=icon}
分享.png){kind=icon}
收藏
摘要
En 中文
Until the 1970s, both banks and nonfinancial corporations relied on performance targets linked to their earnings per share (EPS). Over the next few decades, banks rapidly changed to emphasize return on equity (ROE) as a performance target. Investors seem aware of this change because ROE growth (EPS growth) better explains banks' (nonfinancials') stock market values. Also, manager compensation linked to ROE is more common for banks than for nonfinancials. This paper presents a model of a bank subject to fixedrate deposit insurance and facing increasing competition that erodes its charter value. When the bank chooses its capital to maximize its shareholder value, its performance based on ROE appears better than its performance based on EPS. Thus, the increase in competition that started in the 1970s, along with fixed-rate deposit insurance, may explain banks' growing preference for ROE over EPS as a performance target. (c) 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Keyword:
Bank performance
ROE
Bank regulation
AI总结
对已上传原文的论文进行重点信息的提取，主要内容包括：简要概述、研究摘要、背景介绍、关键亮点、图文解析、展望与总结。
期刊
IF:
4.2
论文数:
1.2K
被引数:
4.5K
机构
引用论文
GLI3 repressor determines Hedgehog pathway activation and is required for response to SMO antagonist glasdegib in AML.png)
Blood
OAAI
BloodIF0
OAAI分享收藏Why Don't All Banks Practice Regulatory Arbitrage? Evidence from Usage of Trust-Preferred Securities
PREAI
分享收藏
查看更多内容