Worker replacement

Guido Menzio

doi:10.1016/j.jmoneco.2010.05.015

Worker replacement

2010-09-01

24

PRE

AI

DOI：10.1016/j.jmoneco.2010.05.015

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摘要

En 中文

Consider a labor market in which firms want to insure existing employees against income fluctuations and, simultaneously, want to recruit new employees to fill vacant jobs. Firms can commit to a wage policy, i.e. a policy that specifies the wage paid to their employees as a function of tenure, productivity and other observables. However, firms cannot commit to employ workers. In this environment, the optimal wage policy prescribes not only a rigid wage for senior workers, but also a downward rigid wage for new hires. The downward rigidity in the hiring wage magnifies the response of unemployment to negative shocks. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Keyword:

EMPLOYMENT FLUCTUATIONS

IMPLICIT CONTRACTS

WAGE STICKINESS

UNEMPLOYMENT

VACANCIES

Worker replacement

摘要

期刊

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