.png){kind=icon}
.png){kind=icon}
Return
A cross-process Spectre attack via cache on RISC-V processor with trusted execution environment
.png){kind=icon}
OA
AI
DOI：10.1016/j.compeleceng.2022.108546.png)
.png){kind=icon}
.png){kind=icon}
Share.png){kind=icon}
Save
Abstract
En 中文
The trust execution environment (TEE) provides a safe region, also known as a secret enclave, for executing private programs that need protection. This work proposed a cross-process exploitation scheme for conducting the cache side-channel attack, Spectre, on RISC-V processors with a trust execution environment. Practical experiments are provided to verify the protected enclave's security on RISC-V processors with the TEE. In these experiments, the attacker and victim do not share the same address space as in known implementations but are executed in separate processes. The experimental results show that initial leakage information from the cache memory can be recorded. To the best of our knowledge, no prior research has been conducted on the Spectre attack against RISC-V's TEE. This implementation will be a critical component for extending further cache side-channel experiments on the security of RISC-V processors.
Keywords:
RISC-V
Spectre
Side-channel attack
Trusted execution environment
Cache memory
Secure enclave
Hybrid processor
Open source
Software
Security
AI Summary
Key information extracted from the uploaded paper, including a brief overview, abstract, background, key highlights, visual analysis, and future outlook.
Journal
C
IF:
4.9
Papers:
6.7K
Citations:
1.3W