A fault attack on pairing-based cryptography

doi:10.1109/TC.2006.134

A fault attack on pairing-based cryptography

2006-09-01

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DOI：10.1109/TC.2006.134

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Abstract

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Current fault attacks against public key cryptography focus on traditional schemes, such as RSA and ECC, and, to a lesser extent, on primitives such as XTR. However, bilinear maps, or pairings, have presented theorists with a new and increasingly popular way of constructing cryptographic protocols. Most notably, this has resulted in efficient methods for Identity Based Encryption ( IBE). Since identity-based cryptography seems an ideal partner for identity aware devices such as smart-cards, in this paper, we examine the security of concrete pairing instantiations in terms of fault attack.

Keywords:

cryptography

fault attack

Tate pairing

identity based encryption

A fault attack on pairing-based cryptography

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