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A Game-Theoretic Framework for the Virtual Machines Migration Timing Problem
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DOI：10.1109/TCC.2019.2905605.png)
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Abstract
En 中文
In a multi-tenant cloud, a number of Virtual Machines (VMs) are collocated on the same physical machine to optimize performance, power consumption and maximize profit. This, however, increases the risk of a malicious VM performing side-channel attacks and leaking sensitive information from neighboring VMs. As such, this paper develops and analyzes a game-theoretic framework for the VM migration timing problem in which the cloud provider decides when to migrate a VM to a different physical machine to reduce the risk of being compromised by a collocated malicious VM. The adversary decides the rate at which she launches new VMs to collocate with the victim VMs. Our formulation captures a data leakage model in which the cost incurred by the cloud provider depends on the duration of collocation with malicious VMs. It also captures costs incurred by the adversary in launching new VMs and by the defender in migrating VMs. We establish sufficient conditions for the existence of Nash equilibria for general cost functions, as well as for specific instantiations, and characterize the best response for both players. Furthermore, we extend our model to characterize its impact on the attacker's payoff when the cloud utilizes intrusion detection systems that detect side-channel attacks. Our theoretical findings are corroborated with extensive numerical results in various settings as well as a proof-of-concept implementation in a realistic cloud setting.
Keywords:
Cloud security
game theory
VM migration
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