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A systematic survey of side-channel attack surfaces in intel TDX
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DOI：10.1016/j.cose.2026.105024.png)
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Abstract
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• We show that execution observability introduces side-channel leakage in Intel TDX. • We identify the host-mediated execution model as the root cause of the side-channel. • We propose a (P,C,A) framework for the systematic analysis. • We reveal limitations of existing defenses against TDX side-channel attacks.
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5.4
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164
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