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Algorithms for the coalitional manipulation problem
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DOI：10.1016/j.artint.2008.11.005.png)
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Abstract
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We investigate the problem of coalitional manipulation in elections, which is known to be hard in a variety of voting rules. We put forward efficient algorithms for the problem in Borda, Maximin and Plurality with Runoff, and analyze their windows of error. Specifically, given an instance on which an algorithm fails, we bound the additional power the manipulators need in order to succeed. We finally discuss the implications of our results with respect to the popular approach of employing computational hardness to preclude manipulation. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Keywords:
Computational social choice
Voting
Manipulation
Computational complexity
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