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Aligned Delegation
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DOI：10.1257/aer.104.1.66.png)
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Abstract
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A principal delegates multiple decisions to an agent, who has private information relevant to each decision. The principal is uncertain about the agent's preferences. I solve for max-min optimal mechanisms those which maximize the principal's payoff against the worst case agent preference types. These mechanisms are characterized by a property I call aligned delegation: all agent types play identically, as if they shared the principal's preferences. Max-min optimal mechanisms may take the simple forms of ranking mechanisms, budgets, or sequential quotas.
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