.png){kind=icon}
Return
Allocation among multiple selves
.png){kind=icon}
OA
AI
DOI：10.1007/s11238-025-10086-4.png)
.png){kind=icon}
.png){kind=icon}
Share.png){kind=icon}
Save
Abstract
En 中文
We propose a model of individual decision making that separates a central executive system (Ego) from a sub-self with its own preferences (Cold) and an impulsive sub-self with different preferences (Hot). Ego cares only about the payoffs of the other two sub-selves and allocates available resources between them. For standard neoclassical preferences over joint consumption, we show that in subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, Ego will choose a resource allocation that enables neither Hot nor Cold to attain their most preferred affordable bundle. Moreover, the two sub-selves each choose a more extreme and specialized bundle than they would choose if they unilaterally controlled all available resources.
Keywords:
Multiple self
Menu dependence
Individual choice
C72
D11
D16
AI Summary
Key information extracted from the uploaded paper, including a brief overview, abstract, background, key highlights, visual analysis, and future outlook.
Journal
T
IF:
0.6
Papers:
57
Citations:
0
Organization
Cited Papers
.png){kind=icon}
ShareSaveShareSaveShareSaveShareSaveShareSaveShareSaveShareSaveShareSaveShareSave
View more