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An unpredictable environment reduces pro-environmental behavior: A dynamic public goods experiment on forest use
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DOI：10.1016/j.jenvp.2021.101702.png)
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Abstract
En 中文
Environmental unpredictability is one of the most common global ecological problems, although few studies have explored its effect on pro-environmental behavior (PEB). The present research addresses this gap by viewing PEB as an investment in the environment for the sake of long-term benefits and redesigning the public goods game. For the game, the current public goods game, named the public forest game, is combined with the forest resource game such that investing and curtailing processes could be encompassed in one game in which PEB has direct indicators (some of which were distinguished from cooperation for purely profit-seeking). Participants played the game in fixed groups of five persons for five rounds randomly in either the low or high environmental unpredictability condition, followed by another five rounds in the other condition. The results show that when the environment becomes uncertain and unpredictable, both individual and group pro environmental behavior decrease. The present research identifies the negative effect of environmental unpredictability on pro-environmental behavior, suggesting that climate change may erect a barrier to sustainable behaviors by increasing environmental unpredictability and highlighting the importance of environmental prediction.
Keywords:
Pro-environmental behavior
Environmental unpredictability
Public goods game
Resource dilemma
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