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BCT adoption for organic product deter counterfeiting: Tripartite evolutionary game with government involvement
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DOI：10.1016/j.jclepro.2026.149160.png)
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Abstract
En 中文
Counterfeiting has triggered a series of food safety issues. Organic firms and governments face dilemmas in deciding whether to adopt blockchain technology (BCT) and enforce strict supervision, respectively. Based on this context, we construct a tripartite evolutionary game model involving the government, conventional firms, and organic firms. We analyze key factors influencing individual stability and examine the impact of organic product attractiveness on system equilibrium. The findings indicate that: (1) When organic products have high (scenario H) or extremely high (scenario E) attractiveness, the government should adopt a lenient supervision approach combined with high-level fines to maintain market order. (2) The adoption of blockchain by organic firms is most stable under conditions of extremely high organic product attractiveness (scenario E). (3) The counterfeiting strategies of conventional firms have limited applicability. Such behaviors are more likely to occur in markets markets with low organic product attractiveness (scenario L) or low-level fines. This study extends the organic agricultural supply chain literature beyond traditional operational decisions by revealing the dynamic evolutionary mechanism underlying technology adoption, counterfeit deterrence, and government regulation. Furthermore, it identifies organic product attractiveness as a novel contingency factor that reshapes the evolutionary stability of supply chain stakeholders, thereby advancing the theoretical understanding of blockchain-enabled market governance. Practically, the findings provide guidance for organic firms’ blockchain adoption decisions and government anti-counterfeiting policies.
Keywords:
Organic product
Blockchain technology
Counterfeiting
Government regulation
Tripartite evolutionary game
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10
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4.6W
Citations:
36.8W
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