.png){kind=icon}
.png){kind=icon}
Return
Bidder opportunism, familiarity, and the M&A payment choice
.png){kind=icon}
OA
AI
N
C
DOI：10.1016/j.jbankfin.2025.107595.png)
.png){kind=icon}
.png){kind=icon}
Share.png){kind=icon}
Save
Abstract
En 中文
A familiarity bias of target shareholders allows bidders to opportunistically choose the payment method in mergers and acquisitions. We employ the Yu and Yuan (2015) mispricing score to identify overvalued bidders, reconfirming that overvaluation is a central driver of the payment choice. Using an instrumental variable based on exogenous price pressure, we provide causal evidence for bidder opportunism. Further analyses show that target shareholders more familiar with the bidder are more likely to accept equity despite particularly adverse market reactions. Our results suggest that behavioral biases of shareholders contribute to the transmission of stock market inefficiencies to the market for corporate control.
Keywords:
G14
G34
G40
Mergers
Acquisitions
Stock payment
Bidder opportunism
Familiarity bias
Behavioral corporate finance
AI Summary
Key information extracted from the uploaded paper, including a brief overview, abstract, background, key highlights, visual analysis, and future outlook.
Journal
J
IF:
3.8
Papers:
6.4K
Citations:
2.4W
Organization
No organization information available
Cited Papers