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DOI：10.1016/j.ejor.2022.06.039.png)
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Abstract
En 中文
We study how a buyer unable to (directly) price discriminate should satisfy his demand for a divisible good, produced with increasing marginal cost. As expected, we find that dynamic pricing cannot, while auctioning contracts for lots ( block sourcing ) need not, lead to a higher buyer surplus than setting a price (classical monopsony). However, we show that the optimal combination of block sourcing with setting a price for the residual supply is always strictly superior. Thus, we provide a rationale for two-stage contracting even in the absence of uncertainty.(c) 2022 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V.This is an open access article under the CC BY license ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ )
Keywords:
Supply chain management
Multi-sourcing
Split-award auction
Two-stage procurement
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