.png){kind=icon}
Return
Bonus-Driven Repurchases
.png){kind=icon}
OA
AI
DOI：10.1017/S0022109015000149.png)
.png){kind=icon}
.png){kind=icon}
Share.png){kind=icon}
Save
Abstract
En 中文
Using a large hand-collected database of chief executive officer (CEO) bonus structures, we find that when a CEO's bonus is directly tied to earnings per share (EPS), his company is more likely to conduct a buyback. This effect is especially pronounced when a company's EPS is right below the threshold for a bonus award. Share repurchasing increases the probability the CEO receives a bonus and the magnitude of that bonus, but only when bonus pay is EPS based. Bonus-driven repurchasing firms do not exhibit positive long-run abnormal returns.
Keywords:
CORPORATE PAYOUT POLICY
STOCK REPURCHASES
SHARE REPURCHASES
EARNINGS MANAGEMENT
INTERNAL CONTROL
CASH-FLOW
DIVIDENDS
PERFORMANCE
INFORMATION
PERSISTENCE
AI Summary
Key information extracted from the uploaded paper, including a brief overview, abstract, background, key highlights, visual analysis, and future outlook.
Journal
IF:
2.8
Papers:
2.3K
Citations:
1.0W
Organization
Cited Papers
.png){kind=icon}
ShareSaveShareSaveShareSave
ShareSaveShareSave
View more