.png){kind=icon}
.png){kind=icon}
Return
BOT projects: Incentives and efficiency
.png){kind=icon}
PRE
AI
DOI：10.1016/j.jdeveco.2009.11.008.png)
.png){kind=icon}
Original request for help.png){kind=icon}
Share.png){kind=icon}
Save
Abstract
En 中文
In recent years, governments have been increasingly adopting Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) contracts for large infrastructure projects. However, BOT contracts have received little attention from economists. The apparent agency problem in BOT projects has never been analyzed. In this paper, we develop a model to examine the incentives, efficiency and regulation in ROT contracts. We show that a BOT contract with a price regulation during the concession period and a license extension after the concession period is capable of achieving full efficiency. Both license extension and price control are observed in many real-world BOT projects. We also investigate the efficiency in such contracts by considering other factors, including time consistency, price ceiling, foreign ownership, and the lack of price regulation. (C) 2009 Elsevier ay. All rights reserved.
Keywords:
BOT
Infrastructure
Incentives
Monopoly
Regulation
License policy
Journal
IF:
4.6
Papers:
4.0K
Citations:
1.6W