Catalytic finance: When does it work?

doi:10.1016/j.jinteco.2005.06.014

Catalytic finance: When does it work?

2006-09-01

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DOI：10.1016/j.jinteco.2005.06.014

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In a model of debt crisis caused partly by creditor coordination failure, we show that bailouts that reduce ex post inefficiency will sometimes enhance the incentives for governments to take costly adjustment effort. This model helps us understand a debate about the role of the IMF in catalyzing lending to developing countries. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V All rights reserved.

Keywords:

catalytic finance

IMF

debtor adjustment

moral hazard

sovereign debt

Catalytic finance: When does it work?

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