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CHERI-SIMT: Implementing Capability Memory Protection in GPUs

delete2026-01-01
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PRE
AI
M
Matthew Naylor *
A
Alexandre Joannou
A
A. Theodore Markettos
P
Paul Metzger
S
Simon W. Moore
T
Timothy M. Jones
DOI:10.1145/3760250.3762234delete
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Abstract

Abstract

En 中文
Governments are increasingly advising software manufacturers to employ memory-safe languages and technologies to combat adversarial attacks on modern computing infrastructure. This introduces pressures across the entire computing industry, including GPU vendors who provide implementations of unsafe C/C++-based languages, such as CUDA and OpenCL, for programming the devices they produce. One of the memory-safety technologies being recommended is Capability Hardware Enhanced RISC Instructions (CHERI). CHERI builds strong and efficient memory safety into underlying instruction-set architectures allowing continued, but memory-safe, use of C/C++-based languages on top. In this paper, we evaluate the feasibility of incorporating CHERI into GPU architectures by extending a prototype, open-source, synthesisable, SIMT core and CUDA-like programming environment with support for CHERI. We present techniques to considerably ameliorate the costs of CHERI in SIMT designs, reducing register-file storage overheads from 103% to 7%, logic-area overheads by 44% to a cost comparable to one additional multiplier per vector lane, and execution-time overheads to 1.6%. With the proposed techniques, CHERI offers a viable path to strong and efficient GPU memory safety, while avoiding the need to replace established programming practices.
Keywords:
Memory Safety
CHERI
GPU
SIMT

Journal

P
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 31ST ACM INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ARCHITECTURAL SUPPORT FOR PROGRAMMING LANGUAGES AND OPERATING SYSTEMS, VOL 1, ASPLOS 2026
IF:
0
Papers:
17
Citations:
0

Organization

U
university of cambridge
Scholars:
7.8K
Papers: 3.7K
Citations: 3