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Cognitive Modelism
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DOI：10.1093/philmat/nkaf027.png)
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Abstract
En 中文
Structures are ubiquitous in mathematics. But how should they be understood? Modelists claim they are model-theoretic structures. This thesis can be read in two ways: as a claim about what structures refer to, or about how we conceptualize them. Objects-modelism, developed by Button and Walsh, pursues the first; the second leads to concepts-modelism, which remains underexplored. In this paper we develop and defend a version of concepts-modelism, cognitive modelism, drawing on Carey's theory of conceptual development, and we show how it addresses the challenges Button and Walsh pose for a conceptual account of mathematical structures.
Keywords:
NATURAL-NUMBERS
OBJECT-FILES
REPRESENTATIONS
CONSTRUCTION
DISTINCTION
LANGUAGE
ORIGIN
WORDS
SENSE
Journal
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0.6
Papers:
15
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0