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COMMENT ON COMMITMENT VS. FLEXIBILITY
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DOI：10.3982/ECTA10739.png)
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Abstract
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This comment corrects two results in the 2006 Econometrica paper by Amador, Werning, and Angeletos (AWA), that features a model in which individuals face a trade-off between flexibility and commitment. First, in contrast to Proposition 1 in AWA, we show that money-burning can be part of the ex ante optimal contract when there are two states. Second, in contrast to Proposition 2 in AWA, we show that money-burning can be imposed at the top (in the highest liquidity shock state), even when there is a continuum of states. We provide corrected versions of the above results.
Keywords:
Commitment
flexibility
self-control
money-burning
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