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COMPETING AUCTIONS
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DOI：10.1162/154247604323015472.png)
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Abstract
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This paper shows that larger auctions are more efficient than smaller ones, but that despite this scale effect, two competing and otherwise identical markets or auction sites of different sizes can coexist in equilibrium. We find that the range of equilibrium market sizes depends on the aggregate buyer-seller ratio, and also whether the markets are especially thin. (JEL: D44, L11)
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